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World Oil Market Outlook: 
Implications for Stability 
in the Gulf States 
Robert E. Looney 
Introduction 
Since 1982, international oil prices have 
declined, except for a few short-lived 
rallies, and the major petroleum markets 
have been highly unstable. Starting in early 
1986, these trends became even more se-
vere. The net result has been extreme uncer-
tainty regarding the economic prospects of 
the major oil-exporting countries. 
The immediate impact of the 1986 decline 
in oil prices from a high of $28 a barrel in 
January 1986 to a low of $8 at mid-year has 
been a radical restructuring of the develop-
ment plans of most of the major exporters, 
together with accompanying social and po-
litical strains. Whether or not many of these 
countries will be able to maintain stability 
will depend on future developments in world 
petroleum markets. 
The main purpose of this paper is to gain 
some perspective on these issues by assess-
ing the likely movements in world oil mar-
kets over the next decade. 
Oil Market Dynamics 
After more than two decacwtes of experi-
ence in forecasting prices and production 
levels, analysts have developed several gen-
eral principles concerning the functioning of 
oil markets.I One notable conceptual ad-
vance is that energy is no longer thought of 
as exempt from the laws of supply and 
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demand. It was not very long ago that energy 
was viewed as a necessity and therefore 
unresponsive to price. Similarly, supply was 
thought to depend more on the whims of 
nature than on human ability to find and 
extract the mineraJ.2 
The oil demand situation in the late 1980s 
contrasts sharply with that which prevailed 
at the beginning of the decade. In the first 
quarter of 1981, world oil consumption was 
about 56 million barrels per day, and the 
price of oil was $48.64 per barrel (in 1988 
dollars). In the first quarter of 1988, world 
oil consumption was again about 56 million 
barrels per day. Yet, the price of oil had 
dropped to $15.47 per barrel, this despite 
worldwide economic expansion. 
A recent study3 has thoroughly docu-
mented the events, market responses, and 
adjustments that have contributed to this 
development. 
1. The Iranian revolution and the 
onset of the Iran-Iraq War reduced 
world oil production between 1979 and 
1981, pushing prices up. Because short-
run oil demand is very inelastic (rela-
tively insensitive to changes of price), 
the reduction in supply pushed prices 
sharply higher. 
2. The oil consumption-and-price 
combination that prevailed in the first 
quarterof 1981 could not be sustained in 
the longer run. In the absence of eco-
nomic growth, a sustained price of 
$48.64 per barrel would eventually 
have reduced U.S. oil consumption by 
about 40 percent - from 16.5 to 10.2 
million barrels per day. On the other 
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hand, for U.S. consumers to continue to 
absorb 16.5 million barrels per day 
without economic growth eventually 
would have required an estimated price 
of only $20.61 per barrel. 
3. U.S. consumers require nearly a 
decade to adjust fully to changes in oil 
prices. Oil consumption responds slow-
ly to price changes because substantial 
changes in the ratio of oil consumption 
to output require new capital 
investment. 
4. As short-run demand adjusted to 
prices during the 1980s, the market 
price and quantity of oil consumed were 
pushed down. Non-OPEC oil producers 
added to the downward pressure on 
price as their production decreased. 
Beginning in 1981 however, OPEC 
moderated downward pressure on 
prices by reducing its own production. 
5. Nonetheless, short-run demand 
continued to decline, and non-OPEC oil 
production continued to rise. OPEC's 
continued attempts to support prices 
reduced its production to about 14 mil-
lion barrels per day by mid-1985, Jess 
than 50 percent of its total capacity. 
6. OPEC's attempts to support prices 
ended in a well-publicized failure. Ex-
cess capacity and the incentive for 
OPEC members to cheat on quotas led 
to a surge in OPEC production. With 
demand being inelastic in the short run, 
that surge in production caused a price 
break in late 1985 and early 1986. 
Thereafter, OPEC was unable to re-
strain its production sufficiently to 
drive prices back up to earlier levels. 
The above analysis indicates that con-
sumption responds symmetrically to rising 
and falling oil prices. Given this adjustment 
mechanism, the price of $15 .47 per barrel in 
early 1989 will eventually increase U.S. oil 
consumption by an estimated 35 percent -
from 17 to 23 million barrels per day. On the 
other hand, for U.S. consumption to remain 
at 17 million barrels per day, prices in the 
long run must rise to an estimated $26.63 
even without economic growth. 
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While longer-run movements in oil price 
are easily explained in terms of market 
responses and adjustments over time, short-
er-run movements are still difficult to pre-
dict. In fact, it is fair to say that we have only 
begun to understand the mechanisms con-
trolling month-to-month (or even year-to-
year) changes in price. Even the dramatic 
fourfold increases in oil prices in 1974 and 
the threefold increase in 1979 during a 
period of stable supply appear to defy the 
normal laws of supply and demand. It is now 
clear that inventory demand fluctuations set 
off by supply interruptions can contribute a 
great deal more to the shortage in the market 
and to the severity of the price shock than 
can the initial supply reduction. 
Similarly, we Jack complete explanations 
of the price declines in January 1986 - not 
of why prices fell, but of why the price drop 
took so long to happen and then fell so far. 
The downward pressure had been enormous 
for years, as world-wide consumption de-
clined by 23 percent between 1979 and 1985 
and remained steady through 1985. Even the 
futures market anticipated a price decline 
for nearly three years before it actually oc-
curred, as suggested by the discounts on 
· long-term contracts relative to shorter matu-
rities during most of that time. Moreover, 
we have indications that the market was 
surprised by new information in January 
1986. Saudi Arabia announced its intention 
to increase production three months before 
the price drop, and OPEC failed to reach a 
new accord in light of the Saudi action one 
month before. 
The most popular explanation of recent 
oil price movements is that, beginning 
around 1972, OPEC began exerting its mar-
ket power to control the world oil price. 4 
Certainly, OPEC possessed the potential 
market power to control the oil price: during 
most of the 1970s, OPEC countries not only 
produced more than two thirds of total free 
world output, but also accounted for nearly 
90 percent of all oil involved in international 
trade. Nevertheless, little evidence exists 
that OPEC actually exercised its market 
power. Political events - not OPEC deci-
sion making - were the catalysts that initi-
ated the two oil price shocks and, as noted, 
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these are not explained by reductions in 
supply. 
OPEC production slowed slightly during 
the first three months of 1974 and again 
during the first three months of 1979. 
However, total OPEC production for 1974 
matched that for 1973, and total production 
for 1979 exceeded that for 1978. Not re-
vealed by the production figures from these 
two events, however, is the extent of the 
shortages caused by the demand side of the 
market, in particular, surges in inventory 
demand. 5 
Unfortunately, the extent of the inventory 
demand-shock cannot be fully described be-
cause the only available inventory data refer 
to primary stocks in OECD countries, 
whereas the magnitude of the stocks held 
outside the OECD countries is unknown. 
Still, more than just anecdotal evidence ex-
ists to indicate that considerable hoarding 
occurred downstream from refineries. Im-
mediately after the Iranian revolution began 
in October 1978, refined product stocks fell 
sharply in all OECD countries even though 
crude oil supplies and refining throughout 
continued unabated. 
Deliveries from refineries to downstream 
markets continued at an unusually rapid 
pace through the first three months of 1979 
- indeed, at too rapid a pace to be explained 
by consumption increase - until the proc-
ess finally slowed in mid-1979 and refiners 
began to rebuild their stocks. By this time, 
most of the price increase had already oc-
curred. Refiners continued to build their 
stocks to record levels over the next 12 
months, and in prices offset this slow-down 
in consumption that would soon dominate 
the market. 
In short, past forecasting errors can be 
blamed partly on the one- to two-year lag in 
completing accurate data and the inventory 
adjustments underway in the oil market dur-
ing this period. Long term trends were diffi-
cult to identify, much less to quantify. One 
thing is clear, however: the results of a sound 
projection methodology should be relatively 
insensitive to current events. In this light, it 
is interesting to compare various Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) crude-oil price fore-
casts for 1990 with the average price for the 
year in which each report was prepared. 
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In 1977, the DOE projected that oil prices 
in 1990 would average $24 - the same price 
level that prevailed in the year the forecast 
was made. In 1981, after prices had nearly 
doubled, the DOE projected a nearly 50 
percent increase during the following nine 
years. Subsequently, as current prices have 
declined, projected oil prices have declined 
even more rapidly. Projections made by 
Data Resources Inc., Chase Econometrics, 
Wharton, and th~ other major forecasting 
services show a similar pattem.6 
Clearly, projecting oil prices, particularly 
specific figures for specific years, is highly 
speculative. More realistically, it is better to 
view oil price movements as cyclical. In this 
regard, the rise and fall of oil prices from 
1969 to 1986 is unlikely to be repeated in the 
extreme. 7 The depths to which prices sank 
during the 1960s drove out most competing 
fuels. 8 When prices ascended a few years 
later, most fuel-using equipment was de-· 
signed to bum only a narrow range of pe-
troleum products. In the short term, 
consumers had little choice other than to pay 
higher fuel prices. 
As time went on, however, consumers 
learned to conserve energy and adopted flex-
ible burner tip designs. Worldwide, coal and 
gas consumption expanded while oil de-
mand contracted. If historical experience is 
any guide to future behavior in global ener-
gy markets, the active presence of compet-
ing fuels again will tend to hold down the oil 
price cycle. In this event, competition 
among fuels will most likely prevent a com-
plete collapse of oil prices. 
In world energy markets, oil penetrates 
very rapidly into the bulk fuel market when 
its price is less than $10 per barrel. Under 
such circumstances, global oil consumption 
could increase by 2-3 million barrels per day 
within a few months, largely at the expense 
of coal, and could continue to grow by as 
much as 5 percent per year as oil captured 
virtually the entire increment in world ener-
gy demand. Thus, oil prices below $10 are 
stable only if very substantial oil reserve 
discoveries occur, such as those that took 
place during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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On the other hand, competition among 
fuels prevents oil prices from sustaining a 
level much above $20 per barrel. In the 
longer term, coal from South Africa, Aus-
tralia, the United States and other producing 
areas can easily be delivered into major 
European and Asian markets for $20 to $25 
per barrel equivalent. Natural gas is an even 
stronger competitor. 
A final fact that we have learned from 
experience is that day-to-day oil price 
changes are driven by Saudi Arabian pro-
duction decisions more than by any other 
factor. Since the drop in demand and price 
peak in 1981, oil prices could stabilize above 
their earlier levels only because the Saudis 
and a few other OPEC members were will-
ing to decrease production in order to bal-
ance the market. In the summer of 1985, 
however, Saudi production had fallen to 2.5 
million barrels per day - about one half of 
the country's OPEC production quota and a 
drop of nearly 50. 9 percent from the produc-
tion levels of the previous summer. 
The only way the Saudis could restore 
their production and stem the erosion of 
their export revenues was to retreat on price. 
They did so through a set of complicated 
"netback" agreements that guaranteed prof-
it margins to refiners buying Saudi crude 
oil. As they executed these agreements, 
Saudi officials warned that they were no 
longer willing to act as swing producer. 
Simply stated, the Saudis lost control of the 
marginal barrel of crude oil and thus the 
ability to set prices. 
It is now clear that in the last year or so, 
oil suppliers outside the core of the Persian 
Gulf have been unable to support further 
demand-growth at prevailing prices, and 
Saudi production rates have therefore risen. 
When its market is restored, will Saudi 
Arabia meet the world's incremental oil 
demand by raising price or raising produc-
tion? As late as 1972, the major oil com-
panies projected Saudi crude oil production 
potential as in excess of 20 million barrels 
per day. Such an output is still possible, and 
the investment required to arrive at this 
production level is an order of magnitude 
lower than the cost of providing a similar 
increment in primary energy supply from 
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any other set of resources. It is a reasonable 
assumption that the Saudis now realize that 
higher capacity levels should have been in-
stalled during the mid-1970s to prevent the 
price run-ups of 1979 and 1980. (The Saudis 
themselves wittingly or unwittingly helped 
engineer those price increases by holding 
back on production). • 
So long as Saudi Arabia's leaders are 
rational, they will price their energy just 
below the costs of their closest competitors. 
In the short run, that competition is from 
other sources of energy such as from natural 
gas in North America and Europe, where 
the long distance transmission infrastructure 
is more than adequate to meet current de-
mand. In the longer run, the competition is 
from coal and new natural gas supplies, 
including the substantial cost of adding to 
transport capacity. Thus, the most impor-
tant determinant of oil prices in both the 
short and the long run should be competition 
among fuels in the bulk fuel market. Put 
another way, the marginal supplier of energy 
to the world will base its price on the margi-
nal uses of energy as well as on the marginal 
development costs of fuels competing in that 
, market. 
Because the Saudi reserves are unlikely 
ever to be worth more than the value of 
substitute bulk fuels, the Saudis have little 
economic incentive to restrain development 
of their fields. In short, Saudi Arabia has 
both the incentive and the ability to meet the 
world's incremental energy-demand 
through the rest of the century, and at prices 
comparable to those that prevailed in 
mid-1986. 
In sum, the interpretation of oil markets 
put forth here assumes that:9 
• 1. The tenfold increase in crude-oil 
prices during the 1970s can be ex-
plained by major shifts in market 
forces, without the need of a cartel 
theory. 
2. From 1980 through mid-1985, evi-
dence of some cartel behavior ap-
peared, including dominant 
producer(s) control over output. 
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3. The ability of OPEC or dominant 
producers within OPEC to attain its 
(their) price objectives will continue to 
reflect the basic problems of a non-
govemment enforced cartel - strong 
incentives first to agree and then to 
cheat; the lack of any enforcement 
mechanism; and the fact that about 70 
percent of world crude-output is outside 
OPEC. These basic problems have not 
been eliminated by recent agreements. 
4. Higher oil prices have led consum-
ers worldwide to conserve on their use 
of oil. This market mechanism will 
constrain future oil-price increases. But 
in the early 1990s, crude prices must 
increase due to the non-renewable 
character of crude oil. 
5. The important and large-scale im-
mediate substitutes for oil, which led 
to oil price reductions in the mid-I980s 
and which will constrain future price 
increases, include large reserves of tar 
sands, heavy oils, coal and nuclear en-
ergy in electric power generation, and 
wind energy conversion. These sub-
stitutes are sufficiently large and low 
cost so as to be expected to prevent 
crude oil prices from again rising above 
approximately $20 per barrel (1986 dol-
lars), at least until 1993. 
The Realism of Recent OPEC 
Agreements 
As a result of these developments, by 
mid-1988 OPEC member countries were 
faced with six major issues .10 
1. The desired price level. The coun-
tries with high crude reserves, mainly 
the Gulf states, are not unduly con-
cerned at the low oil price. Others, such 
as Iran, Libya, and Venezuela, were 
anxious to raise prices. There were po-
litical implications - although lower 
prices helped ensure long-term demand 
for OPEC crude, lower prices also de-
creased Iran's oil revenues by 22 per-
cent in the first half of 1988, while 
increasing Iraq's revenues by 25 percent 
during the same period. 
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2. Iraq's quota. Iraq had refused to 
accept an OPEC allocation that was less 
than Iran's. Indeed, Iraq had increased 
its production in the two preceding 
years to reach an average of2.5 million 
barrels per day. This forced the organi-
zation into the position of either having 
to raise the overall quota-level of the 
organization, or to seek reductions from 
other members if it were to accommo-
date Iraq. With prices lower than $18 
per barrel, no country was willing to 
sacrifice production. It was clear, 
however, that without some reduction, 
prices would not rise to the targeted $18 
per barrel. 
3. Over-production by the United 
Arab Emirates. The UAE had uni-
laterally increased its quota to 1.5 mil-
lion barrels per day from its agreed 
948,000 barrel-per-day quota. 
4. Neutral Zone Quotas. With the 
end of the Gulf war in sight, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait came under in-
creased pressure to include neutral-
zone production in a future quota agree-
ment. As of mid-1988, zone production 
of about 200,000 to 400,000 barrels per 
day was not included in either country's 
quota, largely because each govern-
ment contributed part of its revenues 
from this oil to Iraq's war efforts. 
5. Definition of Oil. In recent years, 
the Arab Gulf producers have ques-
tioned the exportation of Algerian and 
Venezuelan condensates as .. non-oil" 
products. The Arab Gulf States claim 
these products are being produced and 
sold in amounts that exceed the allowed 
levels. The debate centers on the sales 
of very heavy and very light oils, which 
account for nearly 2 million barrels per 
day of the organization's exports. 
6. Cooperation with non-OPEC 
Producers. Six non-OPEC members -
Malaysia, Mexico, Egypt, Oman, An-
gola and China - conditionally agreed 
at the full OPEC meeting in June 1989 
to cut production. OPEC members 
failed to agree on a reciprocal package. 
The danger for the organization is that 
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production by non-OPEC members is 
continuing to increase at a rate that 
exceeds the growth in world oil de-
mand. 
In light of these considerations, the agree-
ment hammered out by OPEC in Vienna on 
November 28, I 988, has been greeted with a 
familiar mixture of doubt and optimism. On 
the positive side, it has been seen as a 
realistic compromise involving concessions 
and gains for all 13 member states. More-
over, it reflects the improved political at-
mosphere that has resulted from the cease-
fire between Iran and Iraq. 
On the other hand, it is clear that ad-
herence to quotas will be an ongoing 
problem: 
Within 24 hours of their agreement's sign-
ing, doubts had begun to surface about the 
commitment of the UAE, one of the most 
persistent OPEC quota violators. UAE Pe-
troleum & Mineral Resources Minister 
Manaa Bin Said al-Otaibah was quoted in 
the emirate's press as saying that the new 
quota was not official, but the UAE had 
promised to co-operate with OPEC. 11 
The problem with the UAE indicates that. 
many of the conflicts between OPEC mem-
bers, and even within the restrictive political 
establishments of OPEC countries, will con-
tinue to test the organization's ability to keep 
the terms of oil trade in the collective inter-
est of the 13 member states. 
In short, there is no real reason to suppose 
that the new production quotas will be fol-
lowed. Given likely cheating within the car-
tel and the inability to control non-OPEC 
production, the glut in supply will most 
likely persist for the next several years. In 
short, while the OPEC members hoped 
prices would reach $18 by the time the 
agreement ends in June 1989, actual prices 
will most likely be somewhat lower. 
On the brighter side for OPEC, non-
OPEC oil producing nations are gradually 
approaching their production limits and 
without a noticeable increase in oil prices, 
production from the more expensive oil 
fields of Alaska and the North Sea becomes 
uneconomical (production cost per barrel 
in these areas ranges between $5 and $20). 
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Beyond 1990, only two non-OPEC oil ex-
porters, Norway and Mexico, will be able to 
increase their oil production. By contrast, a 
15 to 20 percent decline in production is 
expected in the US and Britain, while net 
exports from Communist countries will 
drop to very low levels.12 
Implications for the Future 
For the purposes of assessing likely de-
velopments over the next decade or so, these 
general considerations can be translated into 
a picture of likely price movements. 
The most likely scenario is assllmed to be 
one where oil markets continue the adjust-
ments that began the early 1980s. This sce-
nario assumes that oil markets have not yet 
completely adjusted to worldwide excess 
capacity in the producing countries, with 
the net result that prices and/or production 
levels will continue to fall in 1989 .13 Given 
these assumptions, the oil market of the 
1990s will likely manifest the following 
characteristics. 14 
• 
1. Short-run demand can be expected 
to rise from the unsustainable combina-
tion of oil consumption and price that 
characterizes the late 1980s. Adjust-
ment will be slow. Nevertheless, to-
gether with a growing world economy, 
and low initial prices, the adjustment 
will contribute to strong growth in oil 
demand from the mid-1990s onward. 
2. As a first approximation, given the 
low prices in the late 1980s, the growth 
rate in consumption should begin to 
increase from around 2 percent per an-
num in 1989 to 9. 5 percent by the end of 
the century. 
3. This rate of consumption cannot 
be sustained throughout the 1990s, 
however, since it would result in levels 
of demand greater than the world ca-
pacity to produce oil- little capacity is 
likely to be added with the low oil 
prices that will bring about the rapid 
growth in oil consumption. 
4. Clearly, given the demand they are 
likely to stimulate, 1989 prices cannot 
be sustained throughout the decade of 
the 90s. Previous studies 15 have shown 
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that as OPEC is pushed to full capacity, 
oil prices rise. 
5. Nearly all excess capacity to pro-
duce oil is in OPEC. Given a wide range 
of consumption scenarios, OPEC 
should come close to full capacity be-
tween late 1992 and early 1993. At or 
below a price of $25 per barrel, OPEC 
could reach full capacity no later than 
early 1993. By that year a price of $25 
per barrel could prove too low - if 
world capacity does noc rise. 
6. Similarly, with world economic 
growth rates between 2. 0 percent and 
3.0 percent, oil prices could reach $30 
to $40 per barrel by the year 2000. 
Of course, these price forecasts are 
dependent upon a number of assumptions. If 
world capacity to produce oil is decreased, if 
OPEC restricts its production, if oil supplies 
are disrupted or if economic growth is 
stronger, then oil prices will be higher. On 
the other hand, if world capacity to produce 
oil is increased, if economic growth is weak-
er or if energy taxation is increased, then oil 
prices will be lower than forecast above. 
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Conclusions 
The assessment of world oil markets de-
veloped above contains both good and bad 
news for the Arabian Gulf exporters. Given 
likely movements in oil prices over the next 
several years, it is unlikely that any will be 
able to maintain the level of non-oil income 
reached in the early 1980s. While these 
results are not necessarily indicative of a 
"dismal" future for these countries' cit-
izens, they should alert their respective gov-
ernments that they will be in for a long 
period of sustained internal, social, and po-
litical tension. On the other hand, it appears 
that if they can survive the next few years, 
they should be in an excellent position to 
begin a long and sustained expansion of their 
economies. 
The positive impact of low oil prices in 
the mid-to-late 1980s and higher demand for 
oil into the 1990s should be most pro-
nounced on the Arabian Gulf countries. The 
forecasts presented above imply that by the 
mid-1990s Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, 
Iraq, Iran and Mexico will account for 
around 85 percent of world oil exports. 
Countries like Indonesia, Venezuela, 
Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Britain may 
become by then either self-sufficient or net 
importers of oiJ.16 
By the mid 1990s, the world may become 
once again heavily dependent on oil from the 
Gulf. Crude oil revenues and revenues from 
the sales of petrochemicals, fertilizers and 
refined oil products will finance high 
growth prospects in the GCC countries, and 
t~e 90s could very well see the region expe-
nence boom conditions reminiscent of the 
70s.11 • 
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